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Resumo	Estudos	 de	 direito	 constitucional	 têm	 se	 concentrado	 predominantemente	em	 experiências	 jurídicas	 que	 abrangem	 apenas	 parte	 do	 fenômeno	 do	constitucionalismo,	apesar	de	um	crescente	interesse	nos	sistemas	jurídicos	asiáticos,	 já	 não	 considerados	 “irmãs	 mais	 jovens”	 ou	 meras	 “cópias	 de	carbono”	 de	 Lei	 ocidental.	 Este	 ensaio	 introduz	 a	 configuração	 federal,	conforme	 previsto	 pela	 Constituição	 indiana,	 enfatizando	 alguns	 aspectos	relevantes	da	Constituição	indiana	que	parecem	necessários	para	entender	a	organização	 territorial	 do	 poder,	 ou	 seja,	 o	 sistema	 de	 governo	 e	 do	judiciário.	A	terceira	parte	trata	da	principal	história	política	que	influenciou	o	 sistema	 jurídico	 nepalês	 e	 sua	 evolução	 contemporânea.	 A	 conclusão	explica	por	que	o	 constitucionalismo	 sul-asiático	 e	 seus	 vibrantes	 sistemas	jurídicos	 oferecem,	 agora,	 instrumentos	 necessários	 para	 a	 construção	 da	teoria	jurídica	geral	y	para	gestão	de	conflitos	sociais.	
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Abstract	Constitutional	 law	 studies	 have	 predominantly	 focused	 on	 legal	experiences	covering	only	part	of	the	phenomenon	of	constitutionalism,	in	 spite	 of	 an	 increasing	 interest	 in	 Asian	 legal	 systems,	 no	 longer	
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considered	‘younger	sisters’	or	mere	‘carbon	copies’	of	Western	law.	This	essay	 introduces	 the	 federal	 setup	 as	 provided	 by	 the	 Indian	Constitution,	emphasizing	a	 few	relevant	aspects	which	seem	necessary	to	 understand	 the	 territorial	 organization	 of	 power,	 i.e.	 the	 system	 of	government	 and	 the	 judiciary.	 The	 third	part	 of	 the	 text	 deals	with	 the	main	 political	 historical	 events	 that	 have	 influenced	 the	 Nepalese	 legal	system	 and	 its	 contemporary	 evolution.	 The	 conclusion	 explains	 why	South	 Asian	 constitutionalism	 and	 its	 vibrant	 legal	 systems	 offer,	 now,	useful	instruments	for	the	construction	of	general	legal	theory	as	well	as	an	attractive	toolkit	for	the	management	of	social	conflicts.	
Keywords:	 South	 Asian	 constitutionalism,	 Comparative	 constitutional	 law,	Constitution	of	India,	Constitution	of	Nepal	2015.		 	
Methodological	introduction:	old-fashioned	styles	for	dynamic	legal	
systems?		 Constitutional	law	studies	have	predominantly	focused	on	legal	experiences	covering	only	part	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 ‘constitutionalism.’	 In	 recent	 years,	 we	 have	 witnessed	 an	increasing	 interest	 in	 Asian	 legal	 systems,	 no	 longer	 considered	 ‘younger	 sisters’	 or	 mere	‘carbon	 copies’	 of	 Western	 law,	 as	 it	 is	 the	 case	 with	 the	 valuable–but	 Eurocentric–comparative	law	manuals	and	treatises	(David	and	Jauffret-Spinosi,	1992;	Zweigert	and	Kötz,	1998).	This	new	wave	of	studies	implies,	as	pointed	out	by	A.	Harding	(2008;	A.	Harding	and	N.C.	 Bui,	 2016),	 drawing	 some	 common	 methodological	 and	 epistemological	 guidelines,	 in	order	to	conduct	converging	studies	on	this	subject.	The	 first	 approach	 to	 this	 research	 field	 points	 out	 that	 examining	 South-Asian	 legal	systems	by	adopting	a	strict	 formal	methodology	would	not	allow	to	 fully	understand	 those	experiences.	The	application	of	 the	 top-down	approach	which	 is	 typical	of	 civil	 law	systems	(and,	 of	 course,	 remains	 a	 valid	 and	 technical	method	of	 analysis),	 in	 this	 context	would	be	misleading.	However,	also	the	bottom-up	approach,	distinctive	of	common	law	doctrines	and	based	on	the	study	of	cases,	does	not	suffice.	Until	today,	many	specialized	books	have	been	published	adopting	 these	 two	methods,	and	 they	remain	essential	 for	 the	comprehension	of	constitutionalism.	Nevertheless,	 according	 to	 recent	doctrines,	 such	studies	 ‘completely	 lack	of	a	wider	socio-economic	context	that	informs	these	cases’	(Thiruvengadam,	2017).		The	 key-methodology	 of	 this	 article	 follows	 what	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 ‘sympathetic	engagement’	(Amirante,	2015).	According	to	this	approach,	 it	 is	necessary	to	move	from	the	history	 and	 the	 culture	 of	 a	 particular	 country,	 to	 focus	 on	 political	 and	 legal	 issues.	 Thus,	fieldwork	 was	 a	 central	 step	 for	 acquiring	 some	 cultural	 elements	 that	 allowed	 me	 to	understand	 the	 legal	 data	 from	 a	 broader	 perspective.	 Furthermore,	 by	 using	 this	methodological	 approach,	 I	 tried	 to	 provide	 an	 empirical	 proof	 of	 the	 need	 for	 the	 tools	 of	comparative	 politics	 in	 comparative	 constitutional	 law	 studies.	 In	 particular,	 in	 this	work	 I	share	 the	 same	 perspective	 adopted	 by	 A.K.	 Thiruvengadam	 (2017,	 p.	 6),	where	 he	 affirms	that	 “there	 is,	by	now,	a	 considerable	body	of	 scholarships	which	provides	 reasonably	good	resources	 to	 obtain	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 doctrinal	 output	 of	 the	 judiciary	 on	 important	constitutional	 questions,”	 but,	 as	 also	 highlighted	 by	 K.L.	 Scheppele	 (2003,	 p.	 15),	 “the	fundamental	 features	 of	 a	 constitutional	 order	 are	 the	 results	 of	 political	 bargain	 that	 go	
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beyond	the	interpretive	capacities	of	courts.”	On	the	same	note,	we	must	recall	M.	Tushnet’s	assumption	 that	 “the	 theoretical	 commitments	 thought	 to	 define	 [South-Asian]	constitutionalism	share	an	uneasy	relationship	with	on-the-ground	pressures	that	the	politics	of	these	regions	generates”	(Tushnet	and	Khosla,	2014,	p.	5).	These	contextual	studies	explain	the	need	to	combine	legal	and	extra-legal	methodologies.	Additionally,	S.	Choudhry	(2014,	p.	19)	admitted	that	“we	must	study	South	Asia	on	its	own	terms.	To	come	to	grips	with	South	Asian	constitutional	 law	and	politics	requires	 that	we	develop	our	research	agendas	around	the	 actual	 practice	 of	 constitutional	 actors	 in	 South	 Asia.”	 Here,	 Choudhry’s	 ‘constitutional	actors’	are	the	product	of	culture,	society	and	politics,	e.g.	religion,	languages,	ethnicity,	etc.	In	other	 words,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 find	 a	 balance	 between	 the	 bottom-up	 and	 the	 top–down	approaches,	in	order	to	analyse	the	research	topic	within	context.		When	G.J.	 Jacobsohn	 (2005)	 theorised	 his	 ‘ameliorative	 secularism’	 definition	 for	 India,	based	on	the	connection	between	the	Indian	Constitution	and	the	society,	he	adopted	such	a	methodology.	The	American	comparative	lawyer,	completely	avoiding	an	unproductive	study	merely	based	on	 cases,	 took	 into	account	 Indian	history,	 culture,	what	 emerged	 in	 the	 legal	and	 political	 field	 since	 the	 Constituent	 Assembly	 debates,	 as	well	 as	 contemporary	 issues.	This	 mixed	 methodological	 approach	 is	 also	 well	 explained	 in	 Jacobsohn’s	 Constitutional	
Identity	 (2010,	 p.	 324):	 “Imagining	 a	 polity	 in	 which	 the	 live	 hand	 of	 the	 present	 was	 the	animating	and	sole	directive	source	for	its	constitutive	choices	is	to	imagine	a	polity	without	a	constitutional	identity.”	In	the	same	way,	studying	constitutionalism	solely	in	its	present	(case	law	 studies)	 is	 to	 imagine	 a	 constitutionalism	without	 identity;	 similarly,	 studying	 only	 the	text	 (mere	 study	 on	 articles)	 is	 to	 imagine	 a	 supposed	 constitutional	 identity	 without	 a	present.	Applying	 this	 mixed	 methodological	 perspective	 to	 this	 enquiry	 on	 South	 Asian	constitutionalism,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 immediately	 recognise	 the	 distance	 between	 the	 Indian	legal	system	and	the	others	(Bangladesh,	Pakistan,	Sri	Lanka	and	Nepal),	both	in	practical	and	conceptual	grounds	(Amirante,	2019;	Tushnet	and	Khosla,	2015).	However,	I	also	assume	that	“India’s	 Common	 Law	 heritage	 cannot	 be	 uncritically	 accepted”	 (Singh,	 2019).	 From	 this	perspective,	 contemporary	 Nepal’s	 events	 offer	 the	 opportunity	 to	 investigate	 the	 heuristic	contribution	of	 the	 Indian	experience	and	 its	role	 in	 the	subcontinent.	Nepal	adopted	a	new	Constitution	in	2015,	and	this	event	provides	the	opportunity	to	find	out	whether	there	was	an	impact	of	the	Indian	legal	system	in	crafting	the	‘new’	state.	Therefore,	this	article	tries	to	answer	 the	 following	 basic	 questions:	 can	 the	 Indian	 Constitution	 be	 considered	 an	autochthonous	 document?	 Is	 the	 Indian	 Constitution	 ‘pristine’?	 How	 has	 the	 Indian	Constitution	 been	 able	 to	 put	 together	 its	 own	 cultural	 differences,	 and	 work	 for	 seventy	years?	 Has	 the	 Indian	 Constitution	 been	 a	 model	 for	 the	 ‘new’	 Nepal?	 Is	 the	 Indian	Constitution	a	model	also	for	other	legal	systems	in	South	Asia?		The	article	is	divided	into	four	main	parts.	In	the	first	paragraph	I	introduce	the	historical,	political	 and	 anthropological	 background	 of	 the	 Indian	 Constitution,	 explaining	 the	 ‘idea	 of	India’	developed	over	centuries,	and	illustrating	the	variegated	composition	of	Indian	society	(with	 its	 overlap	 of	 languages,	 ethnicities,	 and	 religions).	 The	 second	 paragraph	 sets	 out	 a	detailed	legal	profile	of	the	Indian	Constitution,	addressing	territorial	division,	federalism,	the	form	of	government,	as	well	as	the	judiciary	and	the	enforcement	of	constitutional	provisions.	The	 third	paragraph	assesses	 the	political	history	 that	 shaped	 the	Nepalese	 legal	 system.	 In	this	part,	 after	 illustrating	 the	anthropological	 and	 cultural	 structure	of	Nepal,	 I	 analyse	 the	Nepalese	 Constitution	 of	 2015	 from	 a	 legal	 perspective.	 In	 particular,	 I	 examine	 Nepalese	federalism,	the	form	of	government,	the	judiciary,	and	the	enforcement	of	fundamental	rights.	The	last	part	of	the	essay	explains	why	Indian	constitutionalism	and	its	vibrant	legal	system	
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have	become	essential	components	for	the	general	theory	of	law	as	an	excellent	legal	tool	for	managing	 social	 conflicts,	 producing	 an	 exemplary	 democracy	 with	 a	 strong	 institutional	structure.	For	these	reasons,	I	assume	that	Nepal	chose	to	follow	the	Indian	example	(through	various	legal	borrowings)	mainly	because	it	was	considered	suitable	to	face	the	challenges	of	a	 radical	 change.	 Thus,	 I	 also	 argue	 these	 elements	 sufficient	 to	 consider	 the	 Indian	Constitution,	with	its	legal	experience,	a	model	for	South	Asian	constitutionalism.		
The	“Federal	scheme”	of	India		 The	debate	on	the	territorial	arrangement	of	the	Indian	state	has	always	been	very	dense,	as	 it	has	over	 time	marked	 interesting	peculiarities.	Unlike	other	 federations,2	 the	 choice	of	‘Republic	of	 India’	 (Bhārat	Gaṇarājya)	 as	official	name	excluded	an	 immediate	and	 intuitive	recognition	 of	 the	 federal	 structure.	 The	 reason	 for	 a	 non-explicit	 constitutional	 label	depended	 on	 the	 intention	 of	 the	 Constituent	 Assembly	 to	 eliminate	 secessionist	 thrusts,	while	 avoiding	 potential	 political	 breakdown	 and	 civil	war	 (Singh,	 2019).	 However,	 for	 the	importance	of	the	federal	characteristics,	the	jurisprudence	of	the	Supreme	Court	stated	that	India	 is	 a	 federation	 and	 this	 connotation	 also	 represents	 one	 of	 the	 basic	 features	 of	 the	Indian	state,	and	therefore	cannot	be	altered	by	amending	the	Constitution.3	In	order	to	proceed	with	the	analysis	of	the	federal	structure	of	India,	as	pointed	out	by	M.P.	Singh	(2016),	it	is	necessary	to	identify	the	four	pillars	on	which	the	federal	structure	is	grounded:	i)	the	territorial	division	and	the	presence	of	two	forms	of	government,	one	for	the	territory	 of	 the	 Union	 and	 the	 other	 for	 the	 single	 states;	 ii)	 the	 distribution	 of	 legislative,	executive,	judicial	and	financial	powers	between	the	levels	of	Government;	iii)	the	role	of	the	Constitution	in	Union-states	dynamics;	iv)	the	dispute	resolution	mechanisms	to	set	conflicts	of	competence	between	the	two	levels	of	government.		
(a)	The	administrative/territorial	arrangement	
	 The	 administrative-territorial	 division	 of	 the	 Union	 consists	 of	 28	 states,	 8	 Territories	(including	 Pondicherry	 and	 the	 National	 Capital	 Territory	 of	 Delhi).	 Article	 1	 of	 the	Constitution	mentions	 the	 first	 Annex,	 and	 represents	 a	 peculiarity	 in	 the	 definition	 of	 the	borders	of	the	states,	since	it	is	possible	to	modify	them	by	federal	law,	i.e.	without	amending	the	 Constitution,	 thereby	 avoiding	 the	 procedure	 established	 in	 Art.	 368.	 The	 Indian	fundamental	 law	does	 not	 set	 a	 direct	 hierarchy	 between	 the	Union	 and	 the	 states,	 but	 the	same	Art.	1,	while	merely	indicating	the	territorial	composition	of	the	Union,	indirectly	draws	up	 a	 functional	 hierarchy,	 which	 is	 implicitly	 present	 in	 numerous	 provisions.	 Particularly	interesting	is	clause	2(c),	which	states	that	 ‘other	territories	as	may	be	acquired’	are	part	of	the	 Indian	 Territory.	 With	 this	 clause,	 the	 Constitution	 does	 not	 envisage	 an	 expansionist	policy,	but	establishes	a	legal	basis	for	the	formalisation	of	an	existing	status.	In	this	case,	the	acquisition	has	the	meaning	established	by	international	public	law,	as	an	imposition	of	state	sovereignty	 on	 a	 territory	 (Kohen	 and	 Hébié,	 2011).	 Acquisitions	 according	 to	 Art.	 1	concerned	 Sikkim,	 Goa	 and	 Pondicherry,	 after	 the	 entry	 into	 force	 of	 the	 Constitution.	Concerning	 borders	 and	 internal	 sovereignty,	 in	 accordance	 with	 articles	 2	 et	 seq.,	 the	Parliament	may	annex	new	territories	to	the	Union	or	create	new	states	within	it.	As	specified	
																																								 																				2	E.g.	Federative	Republic	of	Brazil,	Federal	Democratic	Republic	of	Ethiopia,	Federal	Republic	of	Germany,	Russian	Federation,	Federal	Democratic	Republic	of	Nepal.	3	See	the	leading	case	Kesavananda	Bharati	v	Union	of	India	(1973)	4	SCC	225.	
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by	the	following	Art.	3,	Parliament	may	also	alter	area,	borders	and	names	of	the	States.	The	constitutional	procedure	 for	 such	administrative-territorial	 changes	allots	exclusively	 to	 the	President	 the	 initiative	 for	 introducing	 a	 bill	 in	 the	 two	 houses	 of	 the	 Parliament.	 The	amendments	 in	 accordance	 with	 Art.	 3,	 while	 indirectly	 affecting	 matters	 ruled	 in	 the	Constitution	 (e.g.,	 the	 reorganization	 of	 Courts),	 are	 not	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 amendments	established	by	Art.	368,	but	as	instrumental	activities	implementing	Art.	1	et	seq.		The	 previous	 status	 of	 Jammu	 and	 Kashmir,	 which	 was	 the	 only	 state	 to	 have	 a	constitution	of	its	own,	is	particularly	telling	of	the	Indian	federal	structure.	The	organization	of	 relations	 between	 Jammu	 and	 Kashmir	 and	 the	 Union	 was	 governed	 in	 a	 specific,	differentiated	way	by	Art.	370	(Singh,	2017;	Noorani,	2011),4	through	a	peculiar	discipline	in	comparison	 with	 the	 other	 states.	 However,	 also	 before	 the	 Jammu	 and	 Kashmir	Reorganisation	Act	of	2019,	nor	 the	state	of	 Jammu	and	Kashmir,	nor	 the	state	Constitution	were	 sovereign	 entities,	 and	 residents	 of	 the	 Kashmiri	 territory	 held	 exclusively	 Indian	citizenship	(double	citizenship	is	not	allowed).	A	significant	event	that	radically	changed	the	federal	structure	by	introducing	a	third	sub-state	 level	government	took	place	 in	1992,	with	the	73rd	and	74th	Amendments.	The	ratio	of	this	reform	was	the	institutionalization	of	the	so-called	Panchayat	(Village	Assemblies),	which	gave	 a	 legal	 form	 to	 rural	 India,	 completing	 the	 state	 architecture	 designed	 by	 Gandhi	(Choudhry	et	al.,	2016).	About	the	territorial	structure	of	the	Union,	the	Indian	Constitution	outlines	the	relations	between	the	Union	and	the	states	 in	Part	XI,	which	 is	divided	into	two	chapters:	 ‘Legislative	Relations’	and	‘Administrative	Relations.’	This	‘stratified’	arrangement	of	territorial	units	is	a	clear	example	of	asymmetric	federalism.	This	last	attribute	refers	to	those	federal	settings	in	which	the	centre-periphery	relationship	changes	according	to	particular	categories	and	needs,	often	linked	to	factors	that	are	not	merely	legal,	but	also	historical,	political,	and	cultural,	e.g.	the	previous	relationship	between	the	Union	and	the	state	of	Jammu	and	Kashmir	(Art.	370),	the	 relative	 autonomy	 granted	 to	 the	 communities	 listed	 in	 Annex	 V	 and	 VI,	 the	 special	provisions	for	the	new	states	under	articles	371-371J.	The	 Indian	Constitution,	while	not	directly	 foreseeing	a	hierarchy	between	the	different	levels	of	government,	confers	a	privileged	status	to	the	Union	compared	to	the	states,	not	only	in	times	of	government	crisis,	but	also	for	ordinary	administration.	To	analyse	the	structure	so	far	 highlighted,	 it	 appears	 necessary	 to	 define	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 executive,	 legislative,	judicial	and	financial	powers	are	allocated	among	the	different	‘layers.’		
b)	The	(blurry)	separation	of	powers	
	 If	 the	 dogmatic	 construction	 of	 the	 separation	 of	 powers	 between	 the	 legislative,	 the	executive,	the	judicial	(and	sometimes	the	financial)	power	is	implicitly	traceable	in	the	Indian	Constitution,	 it	 is	not	easy	to	 find	 individual	provisions	for	the	allocation	of	 these	powers	 in	the	different	segments	of	the	government	set.	Moreover,	a	rule	for	the	distribution	of	powers	is	 not	 explicitly	 enshrined	 in	 a	 single	principle.	 For	 the	 aforementioned	 thesis	 ‘no	hard	 and	fast	 rules	 of	 universal	 application’	 can	 be	 prescribed	 (Singh,	 2016,	 p.	 453).	 About	 the	distribution	of	legislative	matters,	Art.	246	establishes	three	different	orders:	exclusive	of	the	Union	 (List	 I),	 exclusive	 of	 the	 states	 (List	 II),	 and	 concurrent	 matters	 (List	 III),	 while	 the	
																																								 																				4	The	origin	of	this	exception	resides	in	the	geographical	and	cultural	characteristics,	as	well	as	in	the	history	of	political	relations	between	the	Union	and	the	newly	established	Territory	(formerly	Princely	state	and	special	status	state)	of	Jammu	and	Kashmir.	
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Union	has	the	residual	power	to	legislate	for	those	matters	which	are	not	listed,	nor	regulated	according	to	the	second	List.	In	principle,	the	executive	power	follows	the	fate	of	the	legislative	power	in	the	territorial	distribution.	 In	 particular,	 the	 executive	 power	 of	 the	 Union	 is	 formally	 exercised	 by	 the	President	 and	 the	 governors	 of	 the	 individual	 states,	 which	 are	 appointed	 by	 the	 central	executive.		The	 executive	 power	 of	 the	 Union	 follows	 the	 legislation	 adopted	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	subjects	 of	 the	 first	 List,	 while	 the	 state	 refers	 to	 the	 powers	 of	 the	 second	 List.	 This	distribution	 is	 less	 linear	 than	 the	 concurrent	 subjects	 enumerated	 in	 the	 third	 List.	 In	 this	case,	Art.	162	establishes	 that	 the	executive	power	of	 the	state	 is	subject	and	 limited	by	 the	executive	 power	 expressly	 conferred	 by	 the	 Constitution	 or	 by	 any	 law	 to	 the	 Union	 and,	therefore,	 any	 activity,	 promoted	 by	 the	 governmental	 executive	 in	 violation	 of	 that	 of	 the	Union,	is	to	be	considered	unconstitutional	(Singh,	2017,	pp.	588-590).	The	 Indian	 judiciary	 reflects	 a	 unitary	 and	 non-federal	 idea,	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 local	pressure	 on	 the	 judges	 and	 prevent	 different	 interpretations	 of	 the	 law	 in	 the	 decision	 of	single	cases	(Austin,	1999;	Singh,	2000).	The	division	of	the	judiciary	is	based	on	three	levels,	with	 the	Supreme	Court	at	 the	 top,	which	 is	a	 court	of	 records	and,	at	 the	same	 time,	holds	very	incisive	coercive	powers.	In	each	individual	state,	there	is	a	High	Court	and,	subordinate	to	the	latter,	the	District	Courts.	As	far	as	legislative	powers	are	concerned,	Parliament	has	the	power	 to	 regulate	 the	 organization	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 and	 the	 High	 Courts,	 while	 the	organization	of	 state	courts	 is	a	concurrent	matter,	 shared	by	 the	Union	and	 the	states.	The	President	 of	 India	 appoints	 the	 judges	 of	 the	 Supreme	 and	High	 Courts;	while	 the	Union	 is	responsible	for	the	appointment	of	the	administrative	staff	and	the	review	of	the	budget	of	the	Supreme	 Court,	 individual	 states	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 same	matters	 for	High	 Courts	 and	District	Courts.5	Fiscal	 imposition	 can	 be	 ruled	 only	 by	 state	 or	 federal	 law,	 and	 is	 regulated	 in	 the	 XII	Section	of	the	Constitution.	The	Union	collects	the	most	important	taxes,	such	as	the	ones	on	income,	 excise	 duties,	 taxes	 on	 companies	 and	 services,	 and	 it	 is	 also	 in	 charge	 of	 residual	fiscal	 powers.	 The	 individual	 states	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 establishment	 and	 regulation	 of	minor	taxes	(e.g.,	among	others,	taxes	on	land	ownership,	excise	duties	on	spirits,	etc.).	About	the	 acquisition	 of	 tax	 revenue	 and	 the	 redistribution,	 Articles	 268	 et	 seq.	 contain	 an	articulated	regulation,	which	divides	taxes	into	‘Duties	levied	by	the	Union	but	collected	and	appropriated	by	the	States’	(Art.	268),	‘Taxes	levied	and	collected	by	the	Union	but	assigned	to	the	States’	 (Art.	 269),	 ‘Taxes	 levied	and	distributed	between	 the	Union	and	 the	States’	 (Art.	270).		
c)	The	Constitution	in	the	Union-states	 interactions	and	the	dispute	resolution	
mechanisms		The	Indian	Constitution	does	not	contain	an	express	supremacy	clause	that	hierarchically	subordinates	 the	 sources	 of	 law	 other	 than	 to	 the	 Constitution	 itself.	 However,	 after	 some	jurisprudential	clarifications	pronounced	during	the	first	years	after	the	entry	into	force	of	the	fundamental	 law,	 the	 supremacy	 of	 the	 Constitution	 on	 other	 sources	 of	 law	 was	 never	doubted.	 Moreover,	 not	 only	 ordinary	 law	 is	 subject	 to	 constitutional	 provisions,	 but	 also	constitutional	amendments	are	limited	by	the	doctrine	of	the	‘basic	structure’.	In	other	words,	
																																								 																				5	Articles	146,	229,	247,	312,	Constitution	of	India,	1950.	
Viola	I	South	Asian	Constitutionalism?	
	
Revista	de	Estudos	Constitucionais,	Hermenêutica	e	Teoria	do	Direito	(RECHTD),	12(1):78-97	 84	
an	 amendment	which	 complies	 with	 all	 the	 procedural	 rules	 of	 Art.	 368,	must	 in	 any	 case	respect	the	“soul”	of	the	Constitution.	Art.	 131	 specifies	 that	 the	 Supreme	Court	 has	 exclusive	 and	original	 jurisdiction	 in	 any	dispute	 between	 the	 government	 of	 India	 and	 one	 or	 more	 states,	 and	 disputes	 arising	between	 states.	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 may	 introduce	 an	 appeal	 if	 and	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	dispute	relates	to	any	matter	of	fact	or	law	which	depends	on	the	existence	or	scope	of	a	right;	“the	 said	 jurisdiction	 [does]	 not	 extend	 to	 a	 dispute	 arising	 out	 of	 any	 treaty,	 agreement,	covenant,	engagement,	sanad6	or	other	similar	instrument	which,	having	been	entered	into	or	executed	before	 the	 commencement	of	 th[e]	Constitution,	 continues	 in	operation	 after	 such	commencement,	 or	 which	 provides	 that	 the	 said	 jurisdiction	 shall	 not	 extend	 to	 such	 a	dispute.”		
d)	Is	this	federalism?	Some	hypotheses	of	classification		The	 substantive	 profile	 of	 the	 Indian	 state	 organization	 fosters	 a	 series	 of	 different	hypotheses	for	its	classification.	As	first,	 it	should	be	clarified	that	simply	defining	India	as	a	unitary	 or	 federal	 state	 does	 not	 appear	 correct.	 In	 fact,	 its	 evolution	 over	 70	 years	 has	enshrined	 its	 openly	 dynamic	 character	 and	 its	 ability	 to	 trigger	 a	 metamorphosis	 which,	under	 distinct	 circumstances,	 makes	 the	 practical	 institutional	 structure	 of	 India	 either	predominantly	unitary	or	federal	(Amirante,	2019;	Stepan	et	al.,	2011;	Arora,	1995;	Wheare,	1964.).	It	can	be	noted	that	the	Constitution	tilts	in	favour	of	the	Union,	but	at	the	same	time	it	can	be	clearly	stated	that	the	characteristics	highlighted	are	those	of	asymmetric	federalism.	Although	the	asymmetry	in	the	Union-states	and	between-states	relations	is	evident,	this	does	not	 clarify	 the	 nature	 of	 Indian	 federalism	 and	 does	 not	 complete	 its	 definition.	 ‘Quasi-federalism’	is	one	of	the	arguments	commonly	accepted	also	by	Indian	scholarship	(Wheare,	1964).	 According	 to	 some	 scholars,	 however,	 India	 would	 be	 characterised	 by	 ‘flexible	federalism’	 (Arora	 and	 Verney,	 1995),	 which	 allows	 India	 to	 modify	 its	 competences	 and	powers	on	the	basis	of	contingencies,	and	this	appears	clear	 in	reference	to	the	 instruments	for	 implementing	 the	 principle	 of	 vertical	 subsidiarity	 (e.g.	 fiscal	 federalism,	 the	 state	 of	emergency,	the	possibility	of	the	President	of	the	Union	to	intervene	in	the	state	dynamics).	In	my	opinion,	 ‘federalism	with	centripetal	tendencies’	(Amirante,	2014;	2019)	is	the	definition	that	best	describes	the	Indian	phenomenon.	In	fact,	it	underlines	the	federal	genetic	approach	that	 tends–throughout	 its	 dynamic	 character–to	 the	 institutional	 cohesion	 of	 diversity	towards	a	centre	capable	of	keeping	together	the	multicultural	features	of	the	population.		
The	system	of	government	in	the	Indian	constitutional	experience		 The	 federal	 Parliament	 is	 bicameral,	 composed	 by	 three	 bodies:	 the	 President	 of	 the	Union,	 the	Lok	Sabha	(House	of	 the	People),	and	 the	Rajya	Sabha	(Council	of	States).	 Indian	bicameralism	 is	 asymmetric,	 and	 the	 role	of	 each	House	depends	on	 the	 legislative	process.	The	 Lok	 Sabha,	 in	 fact,	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 political	 agenda,	 in	legitimating	the	executive	through	the	vote	of	confidence,	in	the	legislative	process,	and	in	the	introduction	of	money	and	financial	bills.	Differently,	the	Rajya	Sabha	performs	functions	like	
																																								 																				6	 ‘Sanad’	 is	 a	 legal	 act	 dating	 back	 to	 the	 colonial	 period,	 having	 the	 legal	 value	 of	 an	 edict	 or	 ordinance,	 used	 to	 arrange	 the	relations	between	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	individual	Indian	Princely	state.	In	practice,	 it	often	enshrined	the	adherence	of	the	single	Princely	state	to	the	British	Raj.	
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the	 Lok	 Sabha	 in	 legislative	 procedures	 according	 to	 the	 constitutional	 provisions	 (e.g.	 it	 is	excluded	from	the	legislative	process	regarding	money	bills).7	The	 office	 of	 the	 President	 of	 the	 Union	 is	 regulated	 by	 Art.	 52.	 The	 election	 of	 the	President	is	indirect,	and	he	is	elected	by	a	constituency	composed	by	the	members	of	the	Lok	Sabha,	the	Rajya	Sabha,	the	state	legislatures	(including	the	National	Capital	Territory	of	Delhi	and	Pondicherry).	The	complex	procedure	is	established	by	Art.	55	of	the	Constitution,33	the	term	 of	 the	 office	 is	 five	 years,	 with	 the	 possibility	 of	 re-election.8	 There	 is	 no	 maximum	number	 of	 re-elections,	 but	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 constitutional	 convention,	 the	 former	 President	does	not	run	for	another	term	(only	the	first	President	of	India	was	re-elected).	The	mandate	may	cease	before	the	natural	end	of	the	office	for	resignation,	death	of	the	President-in-Office	or	other	circumstances.	About	 the	 role	 of	 the	 office	 of	 President	 in	 the	 Indian	 democracy,	 his	 powers	 and	prerogatives	 appear	 particularly	 extensive,	 especially	 in	 reference	 to	 the	 executive	 power.	However,	 there	 is	 no	 definition	 of	 ‘executive’	 in	 the	 Indian	 Constitution.	 On	 this	 point,	scholarship	has	clarified	that	to	define	the	executive	we	must	understand	what	remains	once	the	 legislative	 and	 judicial	 powers	 have	 been	 outlined.	However,	 jurisprudence	 pointed	 out	that	 there	 is	 no	 unequivocal	method	 for	 the	 separation	 of	 functions,	 both	 theoretically	 and	practically	 (Pal,	 2016).	 In	 empirical	 terms,	 the	 office	 and	 functions	 of	 the	 President	 are	ceremonial	and	symbolic.		Among	other	powers,	particularly	significant	are	those	concerning	the	appointment	of	the	highest	 offices	 of	 the	 state,	 including	 the	 Prime	Minister,	 Ministers,	 2	 members	 of	 the	 Lok	Sabha,	 and	 12	 members	 of	 the	 Rajya	 Sabha.	 This	 activity,	 though	 always	 regulated	 by	conventional	 arrangements	 and	 practices,	 leaves	 spaces	 of	 discretion	 under	 certain	circumstances,	since	the	President’s	role	expands	considerably	in	case	of	no	majority	or	party	coalitions	 (Rasch	 and	 Martin,	 2015),	 although	 influenced	 by	 the	 electoral	 results	 in	 the	appointment	 of	 the	 Prime	 Minister.	 The	 legislative	 powers	 of	 the	 President	 are	 incisive	especially	referring	to	the	ratification	of	approved	bills,	a	circumstance	 in	which	he	can	also	exercise	his	veto	power.	In	financial	matters,	the	President	holds	impulse,	authorisation,	and	decision-making	 powers.	 The	 President	 is	 not	 excluded	 from	 Parliament's	 purely	 political	activities,	as	he	can	address	the	Houses	with	messages,	hold	a	common	meeting,	and	dissolve	the	Lok	Sabha.	After	 briefly	 describing	 the	 Indian	 head	 of	 state,	 two	 considerations	 appear	 necessary	concerning	 the	 symbolic	 nature,	 and	 the	 collocation	 of	 his	 office	 in	 the	 Indian	 system	 of	government.	As	 first,	 the	Constituent	Assembly,	while	 rejecting	 the	combination	 federalism-presidential	 system,	 thought	 it	 was	 necessary	 to	 build	 an	 institutional	 super	 partes	 office,	which	should	become	a	symbol	of	unity	for	the	country.	This	did	not	prevent	the	attribution	of	powers	 that	 go	 far	 beyond	 that	merely	 symbolic	mission,	 drawing	 a	 hybrid	 figure	within	 a	form	 of	 government	 which	 is	 entirely	 parliamentary.	 Moreover,	 observing	 the	 office	 and	powers	of	the	President	of	the	Indian	Union,	the	influence	of	the	Westminster	model	becomes	clear,	as	emphasizes	by	the	presence	of	 the	President	among	the	parliamentary	bodies,	 thus	fitting	in	the	Anglo-Saxon	tradition	of	the	‘King	in	Parliament’	(Basu,	2014).	
																																								 																				7	 The	 Constitution	 expressly	 excludes	 the	 introduction	 of	money	 bills	 to	 the	 Council	 of	 States:	 “A	 Bill	 or	 amendment	making	provision	for	any	of	the	matters	specified	in	sub-clauses	(a)	to	(f)	of	clause	(1)	of	article	110	shall	not	be	introduced	or	moved	except	on	the	recommendation	of	the	President	and	a	Bill	making	such	provision	shall	not	be	introduced	in	the	Council	of	states;”	Art.	117,	Constitution	of	India,	1950.	See	also	Art.	249	‘Power	of	Parliament	to	legislate	with	respect	to	a	matter	in	the	state	List	in	the	national	interest’	and	Part	XVIII	‘Emergency	provisions.’	8	Only	Rajendra	Prasad,	the	first	President	of	the	Indian	Union,	was	elected	for	two	consecutive	mandates.	The	President,	in	office	from	26	January,	1950,	was	re-elected	in	1952	after	the	first	general	elections.	
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As	it	was	previously	mentioned,	the	Indian	federal	Parliament	comprises	the	House	of	the	People	 (Lok	Sabha)	and	 the	Council	of	States	 (Rajya	Sabha).	The	Lok	Sabha	 is	 composed	by	members	 elected	 directly	 by	 universal	 suffrage.	 According	 to	 Art.	 81,	 the	 number	 and	allocation	 of	 seats	 can	 vary,	 depending	 on	 the	 territory	 and	 the	 population	 density.	 The	maximum	number	of	 seats	 to	 be	 allocated	 is	 530,	 chosen	by	direct	 election	 from	 territorial	constituencies	in	the	individual	states.	No	more	than	20	seats	to	represent	the	Territories	of	the	 Union	 can	 be	 added,	 chosen	 according	 to	 an	 act	 of	 the	 Parliament.9	 To	 each	 state	 is	allocated	a	number	of	seats	 in	the	House	of	People	in	such	a	way	that	the	ratio	between	the	number	of	seats	and	the	population	is	the	same	for	all	states.	Furthermore,	each	state	must	be	divided	into	territorial	constituencies	in	such	a	way	that	the	ratio	between	the	population	of	each	constituency	and	the	number	of	seats	allocated	is	equal	throughout	the	state.	The	need	for	the	specification	‘so	far	as	practicable’10	is	explained	in	the	light	of	the	population-territory	relationship	of	the	state,	since	there	is	no	static	equivalence	between	the	territorial	area	and	the	 population	 density.	 E.g.,	 a	 state	 as	 large	 as	 Maharashtra	 or	 Utter	 Pradesh	 needs	 more	representation	 than	the	state	of	Goa,	which	 is	very	small,	or	Himachal	Pradesh,	which	has	a	lower	population	density	when	compared	to	others.	The	electoral	system	is	the	First-Past-The-Post	(FPTP),	the	543	elective	seats	are	divided	into	as	many	constituencies	in	which	the	candidate	who	receives	the	highest	number	of	valid	votes	is	elected.	The	choice	of	the	Constituent	Assembly	for	the	FPTP	system	responds	to	two	different	reasons:	stability	and	the	best	electoral	formula	for	the	‘Westminster	model.’	FPTP,	in	 fact,	 guarantees	 a	 high	 stability	 of	 the	 government,	 even	 if	 at	 the	 expense	 of	representativeness	 in	Parliament	 for	minor	political	parties.	This	 choice	 is	 explained	by	 the	difficulty	of	keeping	together	 the	variegated	Indian	political	spirit	 if	a	proportional	electoral	system	was	 adopted.	 However,	 this	 did	 not	 lead	 to	 a	 perfect	 two-party	 system,	 but	 to	 the	creation	 of	 coalitions.	 The	 constituencies	 were	 drawn	 by	 an	 independent	 commission,	 the	Delimitation	Commission,	a	statutory	body	operating	since	1962.	The	term	of	the	legislature	is	five	years–except	cases	in	which	the	President	dissolves	the	Houses–but	may	be	extended	one	year	by	 law	in	case	of	declaration	of	 the	state	of	emergency	and	may	not	exceed	six	months	after	the	termination	thereof.	The	 Rajya	 Sabha	 (or	 Council	 of	 States)	 is	 the	 upper	 House	 of	 the	 Indian	 Parliament.	 It	consists	of	no	more	than	238	representatives	of	 the	states	and	Territories	of	 the	Union,	and	twelve	members	appointed	by	the	President	 for	having	distinguished	themselves	 in	 literary,	scientific,	artistic,	and	social	fields.	The	allocation	of	the	number	of	seats	is	set	out	in	Annex	IV,	the	 election	 of	 the	 representatives	 is	 indirect–as	 they	 are	 the	 members	 of	 the	 legislative	assemblies–on	 a	 proportional	 basis,	 and	 by	 single	 transferable	 vote,	 to	 elect	 the	 state	representatives.	The	Council	of	 States	has	an	 important	 role	 in	 the	approval	of	 federal	 laws	and	 in	 the	 election	 of	 the	 President,11	 while	 supporting	 the	 Lok	 Sabha	 in	 other	 legislative	procedures.	About	 the	duration,	 the	Council	 of	 States	 is	 a	 permanent	body,	 one	 third	of	 his	members	is	renewed	every	two	years.	Unlike	the	House	of	the	People,	the	Rajya	Sabha	is	an	expression	of	state	interests	within	the	Union.	However,	from	an	analysis	of	the	distribution	of	seats	it	is	clear	that	the	representation	is	not–and	cannot	be–equal	to	all	states,	thus	leading	to	
																																								 																				9	The	President	may	appoint	two	individuals	belonging	to	the	Anglo-Indian	community	(Art.	81,	Constitution	of	India,	1950).	10	Several	provisions	concerning	representative	assemblies	contain	the	sentence	‘so	far	as	practicable’:	Art.	81(2)	‘Composition	of	the	House	of	the	People’;	Art.	170	‘Composition	of	the	Legislative	Assemblies;	Art.	243(1)(2)	‘Composition	of	Panchayat.’	11	The	twelve	members	appointed	under	Art.	80,	let.	a)	do	not	participate	to	the	presidential	elections	(M.P.	Jain,	2018,	p.	27).	
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a	 high	 rate	 of	 politicisation	 and	 to	 the	 impossibility	 that	 a	 state	 may	 prevail	 over	 others	without	taking	into	consideration	the	interests	of	the	Union.12	Regarding	 the	 executive	 power,	 although	 concise,	 the	 constitutional	 text	 contains	 the	fundamental	provisions	concerning	the	Government	of	the	Union.	Art.	53	of	the	Constitution	expressly	confers	to	the	President	the	role	of	head	of	the	executive,	but	as	I	previously	pointed	out,	 this	 office	 assumes	 a	 symbolic	 and	 ceremonial	 role,	 since	 the	 decision-making	 centre	resides	 in	 the	 Cabinet	 and	 in	 the	 Council	 of	 Ministers.13	 The	 scholarship	 agrees	 on	 the	symbolic	nature	of	the	President’s	office,	not	only	according	to	constitutional	practice,	but	also	to	a	non-literal	interpretation	of	articles	75	and	78	of	the	Constitution,	which	would	oblige	the	President	to	delegate	his	powers,	thus	banning	the	centralization	of	power	in	a	single	political	office	(Singh,	2019).	In	particular,	the	constitutional	provision	imposing	that	all	the	acts	of	the	Executive	must	be	issued	in	the	name	of	the	President	does	not	 imply	that	these	documents	must	be	personally	viewed	(and	signed)	by	him.	The	governing	body	exercising	the	real	executive	functions	is	composed	by	the	Council	of	Ministers,	headed	by	the	Prime	Minister,	and	the	Cabinet.	The	latter,	which	has	a	conventional	nature	 and	 is	 not	 established	 in	 the	 Constitution,	 is	 formed	 by	 the	 closest	Ministers	 to	 the	Prime	Minister;	 it	 is	 the	 body	which	meets	more	 frequently	 and	 the	 body	 that	 decides	 the	political	 agenda	 of	 the	 Union.	 The	 formation	 of	 the	 government	 is	 not	 defined	 in	 the	Constitution,	 and	 the	 appointment	 of	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 is	 a	 presidential	 function.	 The	President,	in	fact,	appoints	the	leader	of	the	party	which	received	the	relative	majority	of	the	votes.	This	also	affects	the	vote	of	confidence,	which	is	considered	implicit	in	the	case	of	very	clear	electoral	results.	The	 Indian	 government	 is	 a	 complex	 body,	 consisting	 of	 heterogeneous	 institutional	components,	 and	 ruled	 by	 the	 Constitution	 only	 in	 its	 essential	 aspects,	 thus	 leaving	 a	considerable	 margin	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 practices	 and	 traditions.	 The	 understanding	 of	 the	Indian	form	of	government	is	also	explained	in	the	light	of	the	historical	and	political	features	and	the	debates	of	 the	Constituent	Assembly,	 in	which	different	choices	had	been	proposed.	One	of	the	recommended	models	was	the	one	adopted	by	the	Swiss	Confederation,	in	order	to	avoid	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 centre	 with	 strong	 power,	 and	 thus	 to	 protect	 ethnic	 and	 cultural	minorities;	 other	 proposals,	 instead,	 aimed	 at	 a	 presidential	 system	of	 government	 close	 to	the	US	one,	with	the	target	of	creating	a	strong	executive	able	to	bring	the	newly-established	independent	India	towards	the	socio-economic	reforms	that	were	at	the	centre	of	the	political	agenda	(G.	Austin,	1999).	In	spite	of	pressures	from	some	groups	in	the	Constituent	Assembly,	the	 founding	 fathers	 preferred	 the	 Cabinet	 government,	 with	 some	 substantial	 differences	from	the	European	model,	among	which	can	be	highlighted	 the	clearly	more	 incisive	role	of	the	 President	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 Crown	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (Shiva	 Rao,	 2010;	Thiruvengadam,	2017).	The	 reasons	 that	 led	 to	 the	Westminster	model	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 organization	 of	 the	Indian	executive	are	twofold:	symbolic	and	pragmatic.	First,	after	the	Second	World	War,	the	British	model	embodied,	along	with	the	American	one,	the	ideals	of	freedom	and	democratic	representativeness;	 moreover,	 the	 real	 revolution	 that	 interested	 India	 was	 social,	 not	
																																								 																				12	 Annex	 IV	provides	 for	 the	 following	distribution	 of	 seats:	Uttar	 Pradesh	34,	 Bihar	 22,	Maharashtra	 19,	Andhra	Pradesh	18,	Tamil	 Nadu	 18,	West	 Bengal	 16,	Madhya	 Pradesh	 16,	 Karnataka	 12,	 Gujarat	 11,	 Rajasthan	 10,	 Odisha	 10,	 Kerala	 9,	 Assam	 7,	Punjab	 7,	 Jharkhand	 6,	 Haryana	 5,	 Chhattisgarh	 5,	 Himachal	 Pradesh	 3,	 Delhi	 3,	 Goa	 1,	 Nagaland	 1,	 Manipur	 1,	 Tripura	 1,	Meghalaya	1,	Sikkim	1,	Mizoram	1,	Arunachal	Pradesh	1,	Pondicherry	1.	Previously,	the	state	of	Jammu	and	Kashmir	had	4	seats.	13	‘The	President	is	the	official	head	of	the	state	but	the	active	head	is	the	Prime	Minister’	(M.P.	Singh,	2017,	p.	429).	
Viola	I	South	Asian	Constitutionalism?	
	
Revista	de	Estudos	Constitucionais,	Hermenêutica	e	Teoria	do	Direito	(RECHTD),	12(1):78-97	 88	
institutional.	 For	 these	 reasons,	 they	 preferred	 a	 system	 that	 did	 not	 separate	 the	 present	from	the	‘institutional	past’	of	the	country,	in	a	perspective	of	continuity-based	governance.14	The	head	of	the	Government	is	the	Prime	Minister,	who	is	responsible	for	all	the	choices	concerning	the	political	agenda	of	the	Union.	The	Council	is	composed	by	three	categories	of	Ministers:	 Cabinet	 Ministries,	 State	 Ministers	 and	 Deputy	 Ministers.	 Cabinet	 Ministers	 are	restricted	in	number,	and	placed	at	the	head	of	the	most	important	ministries;	the	Cabinet	has	decision-making	 functions	 on	 the	 Union's	 political	 agenda,	 especially	 concerning	 economic	policies.	The	State	Ministers	can	be	endowed	with	portfolio,	but	 they	do	not	become	part	of	the	 Cabinet,	 while	 the	 Deputy	 ministries	 have	 auxiliary	 functions	 compared	 to	 the	 higher	Ministers.	The	maximum	number	of	Ministers,	including	the	Premier,	may	not	exceed	15%	of	the	number	of	seats	in	the	House	of	the	People.	As	previously	pointed	out,	the	Indian	judiciary	is	an	additional	element	of	diversification	compared	 to	 the	 classical	 concept	 of	 federalism.	 Indeed,	 even	 with	 certain	 exceptions,	 the	provisions	 on	 the	 judiciary	 reflect	 a	 unitary	 and	 non-federal	 idea	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 local	pressure	 on	 judges,	 while	 reducing	 the	 odds	 of	 different	 interpretations	 of	 the	 law.	 The	President	appoints	the	Supreme	Court	and	the	High	Courts’	 judges,	 the	Union	 is	responsible	for	the	appointment	of	the	administrative	staff	and	the	review	of	the	budget	of	the	Supreme	Court,	while	the	appointment	is	demanded	to	the	states,	alongside	the	budget’s	review	of	High	and	District	Courts.15		
Opening	shutters	on	a	new	constitutional	horizon:	the	“plan”	of	 the	
Federal	Democratic	Republic	of	Nepal		 The	contemporary	history	of	Nepal	has	 revealed	 its	 complexity,	 enlightening	a	dynamic	state-building	 process	 on	 a	 ‘transitional	 background.’	 In	 fact,	 as	 pointed	 out	 by	 Yash	 Ghai	(2014,	 pp.	 369-368),	 Nepal	 is	 shifting	 “(a)	 from	 monarchy	 to	 republic,	 b)	 from	authoritarianism	 to	 democracy	 and	 human	 rights,	 (c)	 from	 a	 hegemonic	 to	 a	 participatory	system	of	governance,	(d)	from	a	state	underpinned	by	one	dominant	religion	to	secularism,	and	 (e)	 from	 a	 centralised	 unitary	 system	 to	 decentralisation	 and	 autonomy.”	 After	completing	 the	reconciliation	process	 following	 the	Maoist	revolution,	 the	new	Constitution,	which	 entered	 into	 force	 in	 2015	 after	 a	 constituent	 phase	 characterized	 by	 discontinuous	fluctuations,	has	 sought	 to	primarily	 counter	 the	 socio-economic	and	political	 aftermaths	of	the	long	constituent	process.	The	constitutional	structure	of	contemporary	Nepal	is	the	result	of	a	deep	change,	marked	by	 the	 end	of	 the	Hindu	Kingdom	and	an	opening	 towards	 innovation,	not	only	 in	 the	 legal	field,	but	also	in	culture.		The	Preamble,	considered	as	the	link	between	the	people	and	the	Constitution,	recognises	the	popular	sovereignty	and	the	right	to	autonomy	of	the	Nepalese	citizens.	Furthermore,	the	Constitution	declares	that	laws	are	approved	in	the	name	of	the	people	and,	at	the	same	time,	it	assumes	the	state	as	 free,	sovereign	and	unitary	 in	relation	to	 the	territorial	 integrity	and	the	 national	 unity,	 for	 promoting	 the	 independence	 and	 the	 dignity	 of	 the	 state	 itself.	Additionally,	 it	 is	 remarkable	 that	 the	 second	 paragraph	 of	 the	 Preamble	 starts	 with	 a	reference	to	the	martyrs	of	the	People’s	Movement,	the	victims,	and	the	missing	of	the	armed	
																																								 																				14	Indian	nationalism	should	not	be	confused	with	a	form	of	rejection	for	no-autochthonous	elements.	In	fact,	often	the	political	choices	and	the	 institutional	structure	of	 independent	 India	rested	on	the	 ‘ashes’	of	 the	British	Raj	(A.B.	Keith,	2011;	G.	Austin,	1999).	15	Articles	146,	229,	247,	312,	Constitution	of	India,	1950.	
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conflicts,	and	the	sacrifices	of	the	Nepalese	people	made	in	the	interests	of	nation,	democracy,	and	 progress.	 The	 Preamble,	 while	 performing	 its	 introductory	 function,	 reorders	 in	 a	discursive	 way	 what	 contemporary	 Nepal	 rejected	 in	 order	 to	 pursue	 the	 ‘myth’	 of	 social	justice.	In	the	light	of	the	previous	reflections,	the	clear	rejection	of	the	previous	institutional	architecture	was	embodied	by	the	formula	“Ending	all	forms	of	discrimination	and	oppression	created	by	the	feudalistic,	autocratic,	centralized,	unitary	system	of	governance.”	Moreover,	it	should	not	be	forgotten	that	Nepal	experienced	about	two	centuries	of	feudal	politics,	centred	on	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 and,	 from	 the	 1950s,	 the	 king	 supported	 nepotism,	corruption	and	exclusion	through	autocratic	policy	(Louise	Brown,	1996).	The	emblematic	history	of	Nepal	has	produced,	in	the	legal	and	political	field,	a	variety	of	socialism	based	on	democratic	norms	and	values,	as	well	as	on	some	of	the	essential	elements	of	 contemporary	 democracies:	 a	 multi-party	 system	 (in	 clear	 opposition	 to	 the	 Nepalese	Panchayat	System),	civil	liberties,	human	rights,	fundamental	rights,	full	freedom	of	the	press	and	a	free	and	independent	judiciary.	These	premises	meet	 the	Nepalese	people’s	aspirations	enshrined	 in	 the	Constitution	of	2015,	which	draws	a	Federal	Democratic	Republic	based	on	the	rule	of	law,	conscious	of	past	events	that	are	still	reverberating	in	the	present	(U.	Baxi,	2013).	The	 importance	 of	 the	 federal	 feature	 in	 the	 territorial	 organization	 is	 marked	 by	 the	choice	 of	 the	 Constituent	 Assembly	 to	 include	 this	 characteristic	 in	 the	 official	 name	 of	 the	state:	Federal	Democratic	Republic	of	Nepal.	 I	have	analysed	 the	Nepalese	 federal	 structure	adopting	 the	methodology	 underlined	 by	M.P.	 Singh	 (2016),	 and	 used	 also	 in	 the	 previous	paragraph:	i)	the	territorial	division	and	the	presence	of	two	forms	of	government,	one	for	the	territory	 of	 the	 Union	 and	 the	 other	 for	 the	 single	 states;	 ii)	 the	 distribution	 of	 legislative,	executive,	judicial	and	financial	powers	between	the	levels	of	Government;	iii)	the	role	of	the	Constitution	in	Union-states	dynamics;	iv)	the	dispute	resolution	mechanisms	to	set	conflicts	of	competence	between	the	two	levels	of	government.	As	per	Art.	56,16	the	main	structure	of	Nepal	is	based	on	three	levels:	Federation,	state	and	local	level.	Other	special,	protected	or	autonomous	regions	may	be	created	by	federal	law	for	social	issues,	cultural	protection	or	economic	development.	The	powers	of	the	Federation	are	listed	in	Annex	V,	the	powers	of	the	states	are	allocated	in	relation	 to	 the	matters	 listed	 in	Annex	VI,	while	 the	concurrent	powers	of	 the	Federation	and	the	states	are	allocated	on	the	basis	of	the	matters	listed	in	Annex	VII.	The	powers	of	the	local	 level	 and	 those	 concurring	 among	 federal,	 state,	 and	 local	 levels	 are	 listed	 in	Annexes	VIII	and	IX.	The	Federation	has	residual	powers.	Regarding	the	exercise	of	the	financial	power,	each	 level	 of	 government	 adopts	 laws,	 votes	 the	 annual	 budget,	 decides	 and	 implements	policies,	and	plans	on	any	matter	according	to	its	powers.	Despite	the	fiscal	decentralization,	the	 Federation	 plays	 a	 primary	 role	 in	 financial	 matters.	 According	 to	 Art.	 59,	 in	 fact,	 the	Federation	may	 impose	on	 the	states	 the	necessary	policies,	 standards	and	 laws	concerning	any	of	the	concurrent	subjects	and	other	areas	of	financial	interest.	In	Nepal,	the	three	tiers	of	government	(federal,	state	and	local)	exercise	the	power	on	the	basis	of	the	Constitution	and	the	laws.	The	amending	process	cannot	be	pursued	in	such	a	way	to	 undermine	 the	 territorial	 integrity,	 the	 independence	 of	 Nepal	 and	 popular	 sovereignty.	Moreover,	 the	 amending	 procedure	 requires	 cooperation	 between	 the	 federal	 government	and	the	states.	Nevertheless,	the	Federation	and	the	Parliament	play	a	pivotal	role.	According	to	Art.	274,	in	fact,	a	law	to	amend	or	revoke	an	article	of	the	Constitution	may	be	introduced	
																																								 																				16	All	articles	mentioned	in	this	paragraph,	which	are	not	followed	by	any	further	specification,	are	part	of	the	Constitution	of	the	Federal	Democratic	Republic	of	Nepal,	2015.	
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into	any	of	the	Houses	of	the	Federal	Parliament.	If	a	bill	relates	to	changing	the	borders	of	a	state	or	matters	referred	 in	Annex	VI,	within	 thirty	days	of	 its	 introduction	 into	 the	Federal	Parliament	the	Speaker	is	obliged	to	submit	the	bill	to	the	National	Assembly	for	its	consent.	The	 Assembly	may	 accept	 or	 reject	 the	 bill	 by	 an	 absolute	majority	 of	 its	members	within	three	months.	In	the	event	that	the	Assembly	does	not	give	any	response	within	three	months,	the	 House	 of	 the	 Federal	 Parliament	 where	 the	 legislative	 procedure	 started	 is	 allowed	 to	proceed	 for	 the	approval	of	 the	bill.	A	bill	 that	does	not	 require	 the	consent	of	 the	National	Assembly	 (or	 accepted	 by	 the	 majority)	 must	 be	 approved	 by	 at	 least	 two	 thirds	 of	 the	majority	of	the	members	of	both	Houses	of	the	Federal	Parliament.	After	the	bill	passes,	it	is	transferred	 to	 the	 President	 for	 the	 consent	 and	 the	 ratification	 within	 fifteen	 days.	 The	changes	come	into	effect	from	the	date	of	presidential	approval.	The	Constitutional	Bench,	a	body	within	the	Supreme	Court,	composed	by	four	judges	and	a	Chief	Justice,	is	responsible	for	legal	disputes	between	the	Federation	and	a	state,	between	states,	between	a	state	and	a	local	level,	between	local	levels.	The	Nepalese	federal	structure	establishes	a	framework	suitable	for	the	functioning	of	the	form	 of	 government	 adopted	 by	 the	 Constituent	 Assembly.	 The	 Nepalese	 system	 of	government,	 in	 fact,	 is	 parliamentary,	 characterized	 by	 a	 ‘temperate	 asymmetric	bicameralism.’	As	far	as	the	composition	of	Parliament	is	concerned,	it	consists	of	the	House	of	Representatives	and	the	National	Assembly.	The	House	of	Representatives	has	275	members,	elected	 with	 a	mixed	 electoral	 system:	 165	 using	 the	 first-past-the-post	 system	 in	 the	 165	electoral	 constituencies	delimited	on	 the	basis	of	 the	population	and	 the	morphology	of	 the	territory;	110	members	are,	instead,	elected	with	a	proportional	system	on	a	national	basis.	In	the	 proportional	 allotment	 of	 seats,	 the	 Constitution	 demands	 that	 the	 federal	 regulation	reserves	quotas	for	women,	Dalit,	 indigenous	peoples,	Khas	Arya,17	Madhesi,	Tharu,	disabled	people,	Muslims,	and	other	minority	religions.	Furthermore,	a	 fixed	quota	 is	reserved	to	the	women	of	 the	 elected	members	 of	 each	party.	 The	 term	of	 the	 legislature	 is	 five	 years,	 and	may	be	extended	for	no	more	than	one	year	in	case	of	declaration	of	the	state	of	emergency.	Within	 fifteen	days	 from	 the	 first	 session	of	 the	House,	members	 elect	 the	 Speaker	 and	 the	Deputy	Speaker,	who	must	necessarily	be	an	expression	of	different	political	parties,	and	one	of	them	must	be	a	woman.	The	National	Assembly	is	a	permanent	body	composed	by	fifty-nine	members.	Reserved	seats	 are	 appointed	 by	 the	 President	 on	 recommendation	 of	 the	 Government.	 Fifty-six	members	are	 indirectly	elected	 in	a	mixed	electoral	constituency	composed	by	“members	of	the	State	Assembly,	chairpersons	and	vice-chairpersons	of	the	Village	Bodies,	and	Mayors	and	Deputy-Mayors	of	the	Municipalities,	with	different	weightage	of	vote	by	members	of	the	State	Assembly,	chairpersons	and	vice-	chairpersons	of	the	Village	Bodies,	and	Mayors	and	Deputy-Mayors	 of	 the	 Municipalities,	 as	 provided	 for	 in	 the	 Federal	 law.”	 The	 remaining	 56	 seats	contain	 further	 reserved	 quotas	 for	 women,	 Dalit	 and	 people	 with	 disabilities.	 National	Assembly	 is	a	permanent	House,	and	one	 third	 is	 renewed	every	year.	Also	 in	 this	 case,	 the	Assembly	elects	the	Speaker	and	the	Deputy	Speaker	within	fifteen	days,	and	one	of	the	two	offices	is	reserved	to	a	woman.	The	President	is	the	Head	of	the	State,	he/she	is	elected	by	a	joint-sitting	Parliament,	and	carries	 out	 substantially	 representative	 functions	 and	 constitutional	 guarantees,	 adopts	 the	necessary	 acts	 of	 his	 office	 on	 proposal	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Ministers,	 appoints	 the	 Prime	Minister,	 the	 Secretary	 General,	 the	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Federal	 Parliament,	 presides	 the	
																																								 																				17	The	explanation	of	 the	Art.	84	provides	 that	 ‘For	 the	purposes	of	 this	 clause,	 “Khas	Arya”	means	Kshetri,	Brahmin,	Thakuri,	Sanyasi	(Dashnami)	community.’	
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formation	of	the	government.	He/She	may	also	convene	the	Houses	of	Parliament	in	common	session	with	 an	 interval	 not	 exceeding	 six	months	 between	 one	 session	 and	 the	 other.	 The	President	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 dynamics	 between	 states	 as	 well,	 considering	 his/her	power	to	dissolve	state	councils	and	formulate	directives.	The	executive	and	political	powers	are	expressly	entrusted,	as	per	Art.	74	et	seq.,	 in	 the	Council	 of	Ministers,	 composed	 by	 no	more	 than	 25	members	 divided	 into	 Prime	Minister,	Ministers,	Ministers	 of	 State,	 and	Assistant	ministries,	whose	 appointment	must	 ensure	 the	constitutional	principle	of	 inclusion.	As	a	consequence,	the	government	 is	also	characterised	by	strong	pluralism.	Regarding	 this	provision,	however,	 there	 is	no	mention	of	any	coercive	remedies	for	the	non-inclusion	of	political	minorities	within	the	executive,	making	this	clause	purely	programmatic.	About	the	appointment	of	ministers,	it	is	possible	to	select	an	unelected	individual,	 but	 the	appointment	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 ‘membership	vote’	 of	 the	House	within	 six	months	 from	 the	 oath.	 The	 Prime	 Minister	 and	 the	 Council	 of	 ministers	 are	 collectively	accountable	before	the	Federal	Parliament;	the	individual	Ministers,	instead,	responds	to	the	Prime	Minister	and	the	Council	of	Ministers	for	the	facts	concerning	their	office.	The	Prime	Minister	is	chosen	within	the	party	which	gets	the	majority	of	the	seats	in	the	House	 of	 Representatives;	 in	 the	 event	 that	 no	 party	 obtains	 the	 majority,	 the	 President	appoints	 the	 leader	 of	 a	 coalition	 capable	 of	 securing	 it.	 The	 appointment	 by	 the	 President	takes	place	within	 thirty	days	 from	 the	publication	of	 the	electoral	 results,	 according	 to	 the	vote	of	confidence	of	 the	 lower	House,	which	takes	place	no	more	than	thirty	days	after	 the	appointment.	 If	 the	 prime	 Minister	 fails	 to	 obtain	 the	 confidence,	 the	 President	 appoints	another	member	who	is	assumed	to	be	able	to	secure	a	stable	majority.	If	in	the	latter	case	the	Prime	 Minister	 fails	 to	 secure	 a	 favourable	 result	 or	 cannot	 be	 appointed	 as	 such,	 the	President,	 after	 consulting	 to	 the	 Prime	 Minister,	 dissolves	 the	 Houses	 and	 calls	 for	 new	elections	to	be	held	within	six	months.	The	 vote	 of	 confidence	 may	 also	 be	 requested	 by	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	motion	to	ascertain	whether	his	party	or	the	coalition	he	presides	may	obtain	the	majority	in	the	House.	Thus,	in	a	situation	where	the	majority	sways	or	the	coalition	is	split,	within	thirty	days	 the	Prime	Minister	 can	decide	whether	 to	 continue	his	mandate.	 If	 the	Prime	Minister	fails	to	obtain	the	confidence,	he	is	relieved	from	his	office.	The	Nepalese	Constitution	also	regulates	the	vote	of	no	confidence,	that	may	be	requested	by	 a	 quarter	 of	 the	 Members	 of	 the	 House	 not	 before	 two	 years	 have	 elapsed	 since	 the	appointment	 of	 the	 Prime	 Minister,	 and	 not	 before	 one	 year	 has	 passed	 since	 a	 previous	motion	of	no	confidence	has	been	rejected.	Unlike	the	constructive	vote	of	no	confidence,	 in	which	the	institution	of	a	new	government	relies	on	the	vote,	in	the	motion	of	no	confidence	a	new	 candidate	must	 be	 proposed	 to	 the	 office	 of	 Prime	Minister,	 who	 is	 appointed	 by	 the	President	only	after	having	collected	the	absolute	majority	of	consensus.	The	 composition	 of	 the	 Nepalese	 judiciary	 is	 the	 result	 of	 the	 federal	 structure	 of	 the	state,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 the	 Indian	 example	 in	 his	 unitary	 feature.	 The	Supreme	 Court	 is	 placed	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 hierarchy,	 while	 according	 to	 the	 levels	 of	government,	 there	 are	High	 Courts,	 District	 Courts	 and	 Local	 Courts.	 The	 Supreme	Court	 is	composed	by	a	maximum	of	twenty	judges	and	the	Chief	Justice	of	Nepal,	whose	mandate	lasts	six	 years;	 the	President	 appoints	 the	Chief	 Justice	on	 recommendation	of	 the	Constitutional	Council,	and	anyone	who	has	served	as	Supreme	Court	 judge	 for	at	 least	 three	years	can	be	appointed.	The	Supreme	Court	recommends	the	other	judges	for	the	appointment.	As	regards	the	legal	features,	the	Constitution	clearly	states	that	the	Supreme	Court	is	a	‘court	of	records,’	and	all	courts	and	tribunals	are	subordinate	to	it.	In	terms	of	jurisdiction,	the	Supreme	Court	has	 the	 power	 to	 evaluate	 the	 constitutional	 legitimacy	 of	 an	 act,	 and	 interpret	 the	
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Constitution	 and	 the	 laws.	 Moreover,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 is	 particularly	authoritative:	as	per	Art.	128(3)	the	Supreme	Court	may	examine,	supervise	and	provide	the	necessary	directives	to	courts,	tribunals,	specialised	courts,	and	other	judicial	bodies	under	its	jurisdiction.		
Conclusions:	 State-Nation	 and	 constitutionalism	 in	 South	 Asia.	 The	
primary	step	for	an	endogenous	constitutional	order		In	 this	 part,	 I	 illustrate	 how	 the	 functionalist	 approach	 adopted	 by	 the	 Nepalese	Constituent	 Assembly	 was	 inspired	 by	 the	 Constitution	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 India	 for	 the	implementation	 of	 legal	 solutions	 and	 constitutional	 tools.18	 In	 particular,	 I	 insist	 on	 three	peculiar	 aspects:	 i)	 the	 territorial	 structure,	 ii)	 the	 form	 of	 government	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	Prime	Minister,	iii)	the	creation	of	a	national	identity	based	on	multiculturalism.		As	per	the	territorial	structure,	the	Nepalese	Constitution	transposes	the	Indian	attitude,	introducing	 a	 federal	 scheme	 divided	 among	 Union,	 State	 sub-units,	 and	 local	 bodies	(comparable	 to	 Indian	Panchayat).19	The	allocation	of	powers	 is	defined	by	 the	Constitution	and	 follows	 the	 territorial	 scheme,	 assigning	 exclusive	 or	 concurrent	 powers	 depending	 on	the	 matter.	 The	 territorial	 distribution	 and	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 the	 judiciary	 is	 similar	 to	 the	Indian	 ones,	 with	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 as	 court	 of	 records.	 Among	 other	 functions	 of	 the	Supreme	Court,	the	judicial	review	of	the	legislation	according	to	the	Constitution	is	one	of	the	more	 crucial	 for	 the	 uniform	 interpretation	 of	 the	 law	 throughout	 the	 states.	 Another	important	feature	of	the	judiciary	is	the	adoption	of	the	Public	Interest	Litigation	on	the	basis	of	 the	 Indian	 experience;	 an	 example	 is	 the	 correspondence	 of	 Art.	 32	 of	 the	 Indian	Constitution	with	Art.	133	of	the	Constitution	of	Nepal	(as	well	as	Art.	131	IC	and	Art.	133	§	1	and	2	NC).		Before	 attaining	 democracy,	 India	 and	Nepal	 have	 gone	 through	 diametrically	 opposed	experiences.	On	the	one	hand,	India	was	administered	in	a	non-unitary	way,	except	during	the	colonial	 rule;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 Nepal	was	 administered	 in	 a	 strongly	 unitary	way,	with	 a	quasi-absent	 distribution	 of	 powers	 to	 the	 different	 levels	 of	 government,	 especially	 in	 the	first	half	of	 the	 twentieth	 century	and	during	 the	 so-called	Panchayat	System.	However,	 the	unitary	 understanding	 that	 the	 Nepalese	 people	 have	 of	 themselves	 should	 facilitate	 the	success	of	 the	 federal	approach,	despite	 the	apparent	contradiction	between	 the	 increase	 in	identity	 membership	 and	 the	 transfer	 of	 powers	 to	 institutional	 bodies	 at	 a	 lower	administrative	level.	The	systems	of	government	of	India	and	Nepal	differ	in	some	elements,	such	as	the	role	of	the	President,	who	 is	 not	 the	 formal	 head	 of	 the	 executive	 in	Nepal;	 however,	 the	 essential	elements,	 namely	 asymmetrical	 parliamentarianism	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Prime	Minister	 are	almost	similar	in	both	experiences.	The	Indian	parliamentary	system	follows	the	Westminster	model,	with	significant	exceptions	concerning	the	number	of	parties	that,	unlike	the	pure	two-party	 system,	 often	 requires	 coalition	 governments.	 Nepal	 introduced	 the	 same	representative	 scheme,	 but	 with	 differences	 in	 the	 electoral	 system	 for	 the	 House	 of	Representatives,	defined	in	the	Constitution	as	‘mixed’	(majoritarian	and	proportional),	which	
																																								 																				18	Both	Constitutions	are	not	merely	programmatic,	but	regulate	the	essential	aspects	concerning	the	state	functioning,	producing	a	very	dense,	long	and	complex	text.	19	 To	 avoid	 confusion	with	 the	 previous	 division	 of	 the	 territory	 and	 the	 Panchayat	 System,	 the	 smallest	 territorial	 units	 are	defined	in	the	Nepalese	Constitution	as	‘Local	Bodies.’	
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encouraged	the	creation	of	a	two-party	system.20	The	reason	for	borrowing	part	of	the	Indian	electoral	system	and	form	of	government	relies	upon	the	positive	evolution	of	the	democratic	example	 of	 the	 Indian	 system,	which	 is	 considered	 a	 paradigm	 of	 popular	 sovereignty	 and	political	 participation.	 In	 fact,	 excluding	 the	 period	 of	 the	 state	 of	 emergency	 (1974-77)	proclaimed	 by	 Indira	 Gandhi’s	 government	 (for	 internal	 issues	 inherent	 to	 public	 order),21	India	embodies	a	genuine	case	of	democracy	and	institutional	‘guardianship.’	The	 Indian	Constitution	has	 to	be	considered	the	authentic	source	of	 inspiration	 for	 the	new	 Constitution	 of	 Nepal,	 due	 to	 its	 undeniable	 success	 in	 transferring	 Western	constitutional	models	 into	 a	 society	which	 is	 deeply	 different	 from	 the	 ‘national’	 European	matrix.	Cases	of	this	Indo-Nepalese	soft	transplant	are	the	parliamentary	form	of	government,	a	strong	 leadership	of	 the	Prime	Minister,	 the	central	role	of	 the	government	 in	the	political	dynamics,	 the	 vote	 of	 confidence	 of	 the	 lower	 House	 to	 the	 executive,	 and	 the	 National	Assembly	 as	 a	 representative	 House	 for	 states.	 However,	 despite	 the	 Nepalese	 attempt	 for	balancing	 the	 ‘Indian’	Westminster	 model	 with	 the	 principles	 of	 separation	 of	 powers	 and	check	and	balance	 in	order	to	avoid	the	centralization	of	power,	 the	weight	of	 the	executive	over	other	powers	appears	to	prevail.	Regarding	the	cultural	core	of	the	societies	here	examined,	a	question	arises:	can	Nepal	be	considered	a	state	with	a	multicultural	matrix?	At	first	glance	one	could	answer	with	a	simple	‘no’,	 keeping	 in	 mind	 the	 historical	 process	 of	 hinduization/nepalization	 (Louise	 Brown,	1996).	Conversely,	the	cultural	division	in	Nepal	can	be	acknowledged,	considering	its	variety	of	languages,	classes	and	castes,	and	its	ethnic	and	geographical	factors.	Even	in	the	religious	field	 there	 are	 minorities	 that	 cannot	 be	 neglected	 (Hangen,	 2007;	 Central	 Boureau	 of	Statistics,	 2014).	 These	 differences	 also	 imply	 the	 creation	 of	 distinctive	 traditions	 and	customs	based	on	the	membership	to	one	group	rather	than	another.	In	fact,	Nepalese	society	is	 multicultural,	 even	 if	 there	 is	 a	 widespread	 religious	 convergence.	 Did	 the	 Indian	experience,	which	based	its	own	matrix	on	multiculturalism,	influence	the	construction	of	the	‘new’	 Nepal?	 The	 positive	 answer	 is	 not	 only	 explained	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 unequivocal	constitutional	provisions	that	directly	affect	the	cultural	field,22	but	it	depends	on	a	number	of	factors	pointed	out	by	A.	Stepan,	 J.	Linz	and	Y.	Yadav	 (2007)	 in	a	 study	on	multiculturalism	and	the	state	 in	 India:	awareness	and	attachment	to	more	than	one	culture,	recognition	and	support	 of	 different	 cultural	 identities,	 a	 de	 jure	 or	 de	 facto	 asymmetrical	 federal	 system,	political	 parties	 set	 on	 democratic	 principles,	 autonomous	 political	 groups	 that	 can	 rule	federal	units	and,	at	the	same	time,	be	part	of	national	coalitions,	multiple	but	complementary	identities,	 obedience	 to	 the	 State	 and	 social	 identification	 in	 the	 institutions	 (Viola,	 2016).	These	elements	can	be	found	also	in	the	intentions	of	the	Nepalese	Constituent	Assembly.	As	far	as	the	formal	arrangement	of	the	constitutional	text	is	concerned,	the	full	structure	of	the	Nepalese	Constitution	introduces	the	Indian	model,	adopting	the	same	order	of	topics.	Since	the	Preamble,	the	contents	are	similarly	organized,	defining	first	the	state	and	the	acquiring	of	citizenship	 (Part	 I	 and	 II),	 then	 focusing	on	 fundamental	 rights	 and	duties	 (Part	 III	 and	 IV).	
																																								 																				20	The	elections’	results,	hold	on	November	and	December	2017,	reproduced	a	pattern	that	was	basically	a	two-party	system.	In	fact,	 the	Communist	Party	of	Nepal	(Unified	Marxist-Leninist)	got	the	absolute	majority	of	the	seats	(121),	on	the	contrary,	the	Congress	party	only	63	seats.	Among	the	major	parties,	the	Communist	Party	of	Nepal	(Maoist	Centre)	obtained	53	seats.	See	the	Election	Commission	of	Nepal’s	website:	http://www.election.gov.np/election/en	(Accessed	on:	November,	2019).	21	In	India,	the	state	of	emergency	has	been	proclaimed	in	two	other	occasions:	from	26	October	1962	to	10	January	1968	during	the	Sino-Indian	War	for	‘external	aggression;’	from	3	December	1971	to	21	March	1977,	for	‘external	aggression,’	following	the	Indo-Pakistani	war.	22	E.g.	Art.	3	–	‘Nation:	All	the	Nepalese	people,	with	multiethnic,	multilingual,	multi-religious,	multicultural	characteristics	and	in	geographical	 diversities,	 and	 having	 common	 aspirations	 and	 being	 united	 by	 a	 bond	 of	 allegiance	 to	 national	 independence,	territorial	integrity,	national	interest	and	prosperity	of	Nepal,	collectively	constitute	the	nation.’	
Viola	I	South	Asian	Constitutionalism?	
	
Revista	de	Estudos	Constitucionais,	Hermenêutica	e	Teoria	do	Direito	(RECHTD),	12(1):78-97	 94	
The	 same	 order	 is	 followed	 in	 the	 description	 of	 the	 function	 of	 the	 system	of	 government	(Part	 V	 to	 IX),	 as	 well	 as	 for	 the	 financial	 power	 (Part	 X)	 and	 the	 judiciary	 (Part	 XI).	 This	choice	 and	 arrangement	 are	 a	 further	 example	 of	 the	 reception	 of	 the	 Indian	 constitutional	set-up	in	Nepal,	which	is	clear	also	through	the	simple	act	of	reading	and	comparing	the	two	texts.	The	results	of	this	enquiry	on	the	Indian	and	Nepalese	experiences	lead	to	a	question:	is	the	 definition	 of	 ‘constitutionalism’	 debatable?	 In	 doctrinal	 studies,	 the	 word	‘constitutionalism’	has	been	used	referring	to	an	‘ideal-type’	or	an	‘achievement,’	as	well	as	to	a	 mission	 for	 ‘stemming’	 the	 state	 power.	 Usually,	 comparative	 constitutional	 history	considers	 the	 experiences	 of	 US	 and	 France	 as	 the	 first	 and	 as	 a	 model	 of	 constitutional	engineering	that	inspired	the	European	nation-states	in	adopting	the	same	scheme	since	the	late	XIX	Century.	Nevertheless,	 as	 some	comparative	 constitutional	 law	studies	pointed	out,	the	definition	of	‘constitutionalism’	that	moves	from	the	historical	events	in	US	and	in	Europe	is	merely	 based	on	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 separation	of	 powers,	 the	hierarchy	of	 legal	 sources,	natural	rights,	fundamental	freedoms,	and	constitutional	remedies.	On	the	other	side,	some	scholars	agree	to	consider	constitutions–and	constitutionalism–as	a	form	of	guarantee	for	the	protection	of	rights	that	increases	the	civil	progress	of	a	society,	performing	 their	 pedagogical	 task.	 However,	 some	 critics	 to	 this	 assumption	 assume	 the	universalisation	of	some	 legal	 tools	 (especially	human	and	 fundamental	 rights)	 is	 leading	 to	‘global	constitutionalism’	(Krisch,	2010),	reducing	different	cultures	to	the	western	models.	With	respect	to	the	definition	of	constitutionalism,	nowadays	 it	 is	necessary	to	critically	rethink	 the	 canonical	 approach	 to	 methodologies,	 classifications,	 and	 legal	 concepts’	definitions.	As	first,	the	historical	data	do	not	imply	the	logic	‘first	is	the	best’	or	‘the	first	is	the	model.’	Contemporary	constitutions,	especially	in	Asia,	Africa	and	Latin	America,	are	not	just	a	product	 of	 the	 colonial	 period,	 they	 reflect	 the	 Weltanschauung	 of	 completely	 new	 legal	systems	 forged	on	 cultural	 and	 sociological	 characteristics.	 Such	new	kinds	 of	 constitutions	can	reproduce	foreign	patterns,	but	their	understanding	will	always	be	affected	by	extra-legal	influences.	 These	 assumptions	 impact	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 constitutionalism	 in	 his	archetypical	sense,	as	also	stated	by	D.	Grimm	(2012)	in	considering	these	phenomena	as	an	achievement	 and	 not	 an	 ideal-type.	 The	 main	 issue	 is	 to	 define	 such	 kind	 of	 achievement,	because	 any	 strict	 explanation	 implies	 a	 pedagogical	 idea	 of	 constitutions,	 excluding	 some	legal	 experiences	 that	 could	 be	 considered	 as	 ‘constitutions	 without	 constitutionalism.’	Constitutionalism	is	a	fact,	and	it	is	undebatable	that	constitutionalism	exists	also	in	countries	with	a	non-Western	concept	or	enforcement	of	their	constitutional	provisions.	There	could	be	a	different	practice	and	understanding,	 in	both	 theoretical	and	empirical	 fields;	however,	 to	reject	 the	existence	of	 constitutionalism	on	 the	basis	of	a	 comparison	made	according	 to	an	‘elected’	 model	 is	 not	 the	 right	 way	 to	 approach	 a	 legal	 system.	 In	 other	 words,	 there	 are	different	 shapes	 of	 constitutionalism,	 one	 for	 each	 experience,	 and	 dynamic	 classifications	take	 into	 account	 this	 perspective	 in	 giving	 the	 same	 consideration	 to	 all	 constitutional	phenomena.		However,	a	single	constitutional	text	does	not	produce	spontaneous	constitutionalism,	the	constitutional	system	has	to	be	effective	in	playing	a	key	role	with	regard	to	the	state	power.	This	 idea	 of	 constitutionalism	 is	 far	 from	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 ‘rule	 of	 law,’	 because	 their	relationship	can	be	unbalanced	and	lean	towards	the	state	power.	Moving	from	this	notion	of	constitutionalism,	 the	 classification	 proposed	 by	 K.	 Loewenstein	 (1965)	 classifies	constitutions	 into	 semantic,	 normative	 and	 nominal.	 Normative	 constitutions	 are	 real	 and	effective	 laws,	 and	 in	 this	 case	 the	 state	 exercises	 its	 power	 according	 to	 the	 constitution;	nominal	 constitutions	 reflect	 socio-economic	 conditions	 that	 delay	 the	 effectiveness	 of	
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principles	 and	 rules	 enclosed	 in	 the	 constitutional	 provisions.	 A	 semantic	 constitution	 is	 a	mere	formal	expression	of	a	‘pseudo-rule	of	law’	that	legitimizes	a	consolidated	power.	The	idea	of	 ‘constitutionalism	as	a	fact’	is	a	keystone	in	the	study	of	Asian	legal	systems,	and	offers	a	 suitable	perspective	 for	adopting	 the	 right	methodology,	 especially	 for	western	scholars	who	may	not	be	familiar	with	this	form	of	laws	and	experiences.	As	I	pointed	out	at	the	 beginning	 of	 this	 essay,	 along	 with	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 transdisciplinary	 methodology	(sympathetic	engagement,	comparative	politics’	tools,	etc.),	many	scholars	are	making	efforts	to	 acknowledge	 Asian	 constitutionalism	 and	 create	 classifications	 suitable	 for	 those	 legal	experiences,	 such	as	A.H.Y	Chen	(2014),	who	 formulated	a	 taxonomy	(starting	 from	the	one	elaborated	 by	 K.	 Loewenstein)	 dividing	 Asian	 constitutionalism	 into	 ‘genuine,’	‘communist/socialist’	 and	 ‘hybrid.’	 Genuine	 constitutionalism	 is	 endogenous,	communist/socialist	 constitutionalism	 is	 a	 Leninist/Stalinist	 legal	 form	 of	 a	 communist	state/party	 legitimated	 by	 a	 constitution,	 which	 defines	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 State	 and	 the	rights	of	the	citizens.	Hybrid	constitutionalism	means,	 instead,	a	system	in	which	liberal	and	authoritarian	elements	co-exist.	Analysing	 the	 exposed	 elements,	 the	 Indian	 Constitution	 could	 be	 placed	 among	 the	borrowed	 (or	 secondary)	 constitutions.	On	 the	 contrary,	 according	 to	D.D.	Basu	 (2005),	 the	Indian	 fundamental	 law,	despite	adopting	 legal	 instruments	already	employed	 in	other	 legal	experiences,	represents	an	original	example.	In	fact,	the	Constitution	of	India’s	outcomes	have	not	distorted	the	society	as	a	whole,	and	have	survived	international	pressures	increasing	the	feeling	of	belonging	of	its	citizens.	Considering	these	peculiarities,	the	Indian	Constitution	can	be	defined	a	‘sui	generis	pristine	constitution’	and	an	evidence	of	genuine	constitutionalism	in	South	Asia,	since	it	has	developed	autonomously,	producing	autochthonous	constitutionalism,	and	becoming	a	source	of	inspiration	for	other	South	Asian	countries	(Amirante,	2019).	In	the	light	 of	 this	 comparison,	 Nepal’s	 Constitution	 represents	 a	 sort	 of	 ‘secondary	 Asian	constitution’	for	the	elements	borrowed	from	the	Indian	one.	Of	course,	as	pointed	out	by	Y.	Ghai	 (2014),	 the	 Constitution	 of	 Nepal	 is	 too	 young	 for	 considering	 it	 as	 a	 case	 of	 mature	constitutionalism.	 Furthermore,	 the	 whole	 Nepalese	 legal	 system	 is	 still	 influenced	 by	fluctuating	 social	 and	 political	 events	 (Upreti,	 2014).	 However,	 Nepal’s	 recent	 trajectory	shows	a	form	of	hybrid	constitutionalism,	which	is	striving	to	become	genuine.			
References			ALEXANDROWICZ,	 C.	 H.	 1954.	 Is	 India	 a	 Federation?	 International	 and	 Comparative	 Law	
Quarterly,	3:393-403.	AMIRANTE,	D.	2014.	Lo	Stato	multiculturale.	Contributo	alla	teoria	dello	Stato	dalla	prospettiva	
dell’Unione	Indiana.	Bologna,	BUP,	184	p.	AMIRANTE,	 D.	 2015.	 Al	 di	 là	 dell'Occidente.	 Sfide	 epistemologiche	 e	 spunti	 euristici	 nella	comparazione	‘verso	Oriente’.	Diritto	Pubblico	Comparato	ed	Europeo,	1:1-36.	AMIRANTE,	 D.	 2019.	 La	 democrazia	 dei	 superlativi.	 Il	 sistema	 costituzionale	 dell’India	
contemporanea.	Napoli,	ESI,	248	p.	ARORA,	B.	1995.	Adapting	Federalism	to	India:	Multilevel	and	Asymmetrical	Innovations.	In:	B.	 Arora	 and	D.	 V.	 Verney	 (eds),	Multiple	 Identities	 in	 a	 Single	 State:	 Indian	 Federalism	 in	 a	
Comparative	Perspective.	New	Delhi,	Konark	Publishers,	p.	71-104.	AUSTIN	G.	1999.	The	 Indian	Constitution:	 Cornerstone	of	 a	Nation.	New	edition.	Oxford-New	Delhi,	OUP,	412	p.	BASU,	D.	D.	2005.	Introduction	to	the	Constitution	of	India.	Gurgaon,	LexisNexis,	596	p.	
Viola	I	South	Asian	Constitutionalism?	
	
Revista	de	Estudos	Constitucionais,	Hermenêutica	e	Teoria	do	Direito	(RECHTD),	12(1):78-97	 96	
BASU,	D.	D.	2014.	Comparative	Constitutional	Law.	3rd	ed.	Gurgaon,	LexisNexis,	496	p.	BAXI,	 U.	 2013.	 Modelling	 ‘Optimal’	 Constitutional	 Design	 for	 Government	 Structures:	 Some	Debutant	 Remarks.	 In:	 S.	 Khilnani	 et.	 al.	 (eds),	Comparative	 Constitutionalism	 in	 South	 Asia.	Oxford-New	Delhi,	OUP,	p.	23-44.	BHANDARI,	S.	2014.	Self-Determination	&	Constitution	Making	in	Nepal.	Constituent	Assembly,	
Inclusion,	&	Ethnic	Federalism.	Singapore,	Springer,	252	p.	CENTRAL	 BOUREAU	 OF	 STATISTICS.	 2014.	 Population	 Monograph	 of	 Nepal.	 Vol.	 II	 (Social	Demography),	Kathmandu,	402	p.	CHEN,	 A.	 H.	 Y.	 (ed.),	 2014.	 Constitutionalism	 in	 Asia	 in	 the	 Early	 Twenty-First	 Century.	Cambridge,	CUP,	452	p.	CHOUDHRY,	S.	2015.	How	to	Do	Constitutional	Law	and	Politics	in	South	Asia.	In:	M.	Tushnet	and	M.	 Khosla	 (eds),	Unstable	 Constitutionalism.	 Law	 and	 Politics	 in	 South	 Asia.	 Cambridge,	CUP,	p.	18-44.	CHOUDHRY,	S.	et	al.	(eds.).	2016.	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	the	Indian	Constitution.	Oxford-New	Delhi,	OUP,	1120	p.	DAVID,	 R.;	 JAUFFRET-SPINOSI,	 C.	 1992.	 Les	 grands	 systémes	 de	 droit	 contemporain.	 Paris,	Dalloz,	523	p.	GHAI,	Y.	2014.	The	Old	Order	Is	Dying,	the	New	Order	Is	Not	Yet	Born.	Politics	of	Constitution	Demolishing	 and	 Constitution	Building	 in	Nepal.	 In:	 A.	H.	 Y.	 Chen	 (ed.),	Constitutionalism	 in	
Asia	in	the	Early	Twenty-First	Century.	Cambridge,	CUP,	p.	367-390.	HANGEN,	 S.	 2007.	 Creating	 a	 “New	 Nepal”:	 The	 Ethnic	 Dimension.	 Washington,	 East-West	Center	Washington,	87	p.	HARDING,	 A.	 2008.	 Asian	 law,	 public	 law,	 comparative	 law	 stir-fry.	 Theory	 and	 methods	considered.	 In:	 T.	 Groppi	 et	 al.	 (ed.),	 Asian	 constitutionalism	 in	 transition.	 A	 comparative	
perspective.	Padova,	CEDAM,	p.	19-43.	HARDING,	A.;	BUI,	N.	C.	2016.	Recent	Work	 in	Asian	Constitutional	Studies:	A	Review	Essay.	
Asian	Journal	of	Comparative	Law,	11:163-183.	HETTIGE,	 S.;	 GERHARZ,	 E.	 (eds.).	 2015.	Governance,	 Conflict	 and	Development	 in	 South	Asia:	
Perspectives	from	India,	Nepal	and	Sri	Lanka.	London,	SAGE,	p.	293	p.	JACOBSOHN,	 G.	 J.	 2005.	The	Wheel	 of	 Law.	 India's	 Secularism	 in	 Comparative	 Constitutional	
Context.	Princeton,	Princeton	University	Press,	p.	344	p.	JACOBSOHN,	G.	J.	2010.	Constitutional	Identity.	Cambridge-London,	Harvard	University	Press,	388	p.	KEITH,	 A.	 B.	 2011.	 A	 Constitutional	 History	 of	 India.	 1600-1935.	 New	 Delhi,	 Low	 Price	Publications,	600	p.	KOHEN,	M.	G.;	HÉBIÉ,	M.	2011.	Max	Planck	Encyclopedia	of	Public	International	Law	[MPEPIL].	Oxford,	OUP,	1112	p.	KRISCH,	 N.	 2010.	 Beyond	 Constitutionalism:	 The	 Pluralist	 Structure	 of	 Postnational	 Law.	Oxford,	OUP,	384	p.	LOEWENSTEIN,	K.	1965.	Political	power	and	the	governmental	process.	Chicago,	UCP,	442	p.	LOUISE	BROWN,	T.	 1996.	The	Challenge	 to	Democracy	 in	Nepal.	 A	 Political	History.	 London-New	York,	Routledge,	256	p.	NOORANI,	A.	G.	2011.	Article	370.	A	Constitutional	History	of	Jammu	and	Kashmir.	Oxford,	OUP,	504	p.	PAL,	R.	2016.	Separation	of	Powers.	 In:	S.	Choudhry	et	al.	 (eds),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	 the	
Indian	Constitution.	Oxford-New	Delhi,	OUP,	p.	253-269.	RASCH,	 B.;	 MARTIN,	 S.	 (eds).	 2015.	 Parliaments	 and	 Governments	 Formation.	 Unpacking	
Investiture	Rules.	Oxford,	OUP,	400	p.	
Viola	I	South	Asian	Constitutionalism?	
	
Revista	de	Estudos	Constitucionais,	Hermenêutica	e	Teoria	do	Direito	(RECHTD),	12(1):78-97	97	
SCHEPPELE,	 K.	 L.	 2003.	 The	 Agendas	 of	 Comparative	 Constitutionalism.	 Law	 and	 Courts,	
13(2):5-22.	SINGH,	 M.	 P.	 2000.	 Securing	 the	 Independence	 of	 the	 Judiciary	 –	 the	 Indian	 Experience.	
Indiana	International	&	Comparative	Law	Review,	10:245-292.		SINGH,	M.	P.	2016.	The	Federal	Scheme.	In:	S.	Choudhry	et	al.	(eds),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	
the	Indian	Constitution.	Oxford-New	Delhi,	OUP,	p.	451-465.	SINGH,	M.	P.	2017.	V.N.	Shukla’s	Constitution	of	India,	EBC,	Lucknow,	1464	p.	SINGH,	 M.	 P.	 2019.	 Examining	 India’s	 Common	 Law	 Identity.	 An	 Inquiry	 into	 India’s	 Legal	
Systems	and	Tradition.	Oxford-New	Delhi,	OUP,	240	p.	STEPAN,	 A.	 et	 al.	 2011.	 Crafting	 State-Nations.	 India	 and	 Other	 Multinational	 Democracies.	Baltimore,	The	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	308	p.	THIRUVENGADAM,	 A.	 K.	 2017.	 The	 Constitution	 of	 India.	 A	 Contextual	 Analysis.	 London,	Bloomsbury,	296	p.	TIKEKAR,	 M.	 (ed.).	 2014.	 Constitutionalism	 and	 Democracy	 in	 South	 Asia.	 Political	
Developments	in	India’s	Neighbourhood.	Oxford-New	Delhi,	OUP,	224	p.	TUSHNET,	M.;	KHOSLA,	M.	 (eds).	2015.	Unstable	Constitutionalism.	Law	and	Politics	 in	South	
Asia.	Cambridge,	CUP,	403	p.		UPRETI,	 B.	 C.	 2014.	 Constitutional	 Development	 in	 Nepal:	 Patterns,	 Issues	 and	 Emerging	Trends.	 In:	 M.	 Tikekar	 (ed.),	 Constitutionalism	 and	 Democracy	 in	 South	 Asia.	 Political	
Developments	in	India’s	Neighbourhood.	Oxford-New	Delhi,	OUP,	p.	84-103.	VIOLA,	P.	2016.	Lingua	e	diritto	nella	Costituzione	nepalese	del	15	settembre	2015:	“diversità	non	discordante”	e	stato	multiculturale.	DPCE	online,	4:77-90.	WHEARE,	K.	C.	1964.	Federal	Government.	Oxford,	OUP,	266	p.	ZWEIGERT,	K.;	KÖTZ,	H.	1998.	An	Introduction	to	Comparative	Law.	Oxford,	Clarendon,	744	p.		 	
Submetido:	08/12/2019	
Aceito:	16/04/2020		
